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Comments
Inheritance Rights
of Illegitimate Children in Kentucky:
A Need for l]eform
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages
society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the
bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head
of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabil-
ities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is
responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is
an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the par-
ent.'
INTRODUCTION
As unjust and illogical as it may be, the illegitimate child has
forever borne the brunt of his or her parents' indiscretion. De-
prived of an inheritance right at common law,2 illegitimate chil-
dren have depended entirely upon state statutory schemes for
their right of intestate succession. Gradually, the harsh common
law rule has been ameliorated by these statutes, so that now all
states allow illegitimate children to inherit from their mothers. 3
But only recently have states begun to place the illegitimate child
on a par with the legitimate one with respect to inheritance from
Weberv. Aetna Casualty& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
2 The illegitimate wasfilius nullius, the child of no one. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CONI-
MENTARIES *458. See generally 10 AM. JUR. 2d Bastards § 8 (1963). The lone exception was
in Connecticut, where it was held that an illegitimate child could inherit real estate from
his or her mother. Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 228 (1824).
3 See H. KRAUSE, ILLECITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971). Louisiana allows
maternal succession only if there are no legitimate children or descendants, and only when
the illegitimate child has been acknowledged by the mother. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 918,
920 (West 1952).
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the father. 4 This change has been prompted by a series of United
States Supreme Court decisions,5 starting in 1968, that apply the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 6 to this
issue. In Trimble v. Gordon,7 the Supreme Court found an Illi-
nois statute, 8 which allowed an illegitimate child to inherit from
the mother but allowed inheritance from the father only if the
child's parents married and the father acknowledged the child,
to be violative of the equal protection clause and therefore un-
constitutional.9 Subsequently, Kentucky's highest court was
asked to rule on the constitutionality of its own intestacy statute,
a statute similar to that of Illinois.10 The Kentucky Court, in light
of the Trimble decision, declared Kentucky's statute invalid in
4 Compare Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Denial of Illegit-
imate Child's Right of Inheritance from Father Who Had Acknowledged but Not Legit-
imated Her Does Not Constitute a Violation of Child's Equal Protection Rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 392, 398-99 (1971) (a tabulation of state
illegitimacy inheritance laws prior to 1969) with notes 76-84 infra (cites a current samp-
ling of state illegitimacy inheritance laws).
5 See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 102 S. Ct. 1549 (1982); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259
(1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976);
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,
411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. at 164; Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532
(1971); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
6 "No state shall .. .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
7 430 U.S. at 762.
8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 12 (1973) (recodified without material changes as
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2(h) (1976)). When Trimble was decided, the pertinent part of
the statute read:
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor, and
of any person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living; and the
lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such person and take,
by descent, any estate which the parent would have taken, if living. A child
who was illegitimate whose parents inter-marry and who is acknowledged
by the father as the father's child is legitimate.
Id.
9 430 U.S. at 776.
10 KY. REV. STAT. § 391.090 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS] states:
"(2) A bastard shall inherit only from his mother and his mother's kindred. (3) If a man
who has had a child by a woman afterward marries her, the child or its descendants, if
recognized by him before or after marriage, shall be deemed legitimate."
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glib fashion." One might have expected the Kentucky legislature
to have enacted a statute to fill this judicially created void as to il-
legitimate intestate succession. It has not done so. Kentucky's
Supreme Court recently chided the legislature for this derelic-
tion, noting that the Court was "powerless to address these prob-
lem areas, which fall clearly within the province- of the legisla-
ture."12
This Comment briefly traces the United States Supreme
Court's recent pronouncements concerning the inheritance rights
of illegitimate children and analyzes the implications of these de-
cisions. In addition, it examines other states' handling of this
issue by looking at both their statutory provisions and their case
law. Finally, this Comment proposes specific legislation setting
forth the inheritance rights of illegitimate children the Kentucky
legislature should enact.
I. FROM 1968 TO THE PRESENT: THE SUPREME COURT
EXPANDS THE RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
A. The Standard of Review
In analyzing an equal protection challenge to a statute, the
Supreme Court's traditional approach has generally been de-
scribed as using one of two distinct degrees of judicial scrutiny. 13
Where the challenged legislation is based on a "suspect" classifi-
11 The Court stated:
KRS 391.090 provides for inheritance by a bastard from his mother,
and from his father only if he has been legitimated through marriage of the
parents to each other. We need not stultify ourselves by indulging in a "com-
plete constitutional analysis" designed to support this distinction on the basis
of objectives we know full well were neither intended nor imagined by the
originators of the legislation. The plain fact is that the law was born and
grew up in a man's world, and the power of government says that such a
world no longer exists and its laws cannot subsist without it. Except for
nature, which often seems blind to those things seen only by human eyes,
man and woman are one and the same, and KRS 391.090 is invalid.
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Ky. 1978) (footnotes omitted).
12 Fykes v. Clark, 635 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Ky. 1982).
13 See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNc, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 523-26 (1978).
1982-83]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71
cation or has an impact on fundamental rights or interests 4 the
Court has applied "strict scrutiny" in its review. Such statutes
have been upheld only when necessary to promote a compelling
government interest, and when no other less restrictive means are
available. 15 On the other hand, statutory classifications used in
economic or social welfare regulation have been subjected to a
less strict standard of review, a "minimum rational basis anal-
ysis," and upheld if they arguably related to a legitimate govern-
ment function.' 6 This test generally has led to the challenged stat-
ute being upheld. The practical inflexibility of applying either of
these two review standards to all legislative classifications has
precipitated criticism. ' Perhaps in response to this criticism, the
Court has apparently developed a "middle level" standard of re-
view in recent cases.' This middle level of scrutiny requires that
the classification be substantially related to a legitimate state in-
terest in order to survive equal protection challenges. '9 The Court
has most recently subjected the classification of illegitimacy to
this standard of review.
14 G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 671 (10th ed. 1980). See J. NOWAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA & J. YoUNc, supra note 13, at 524-25.
Race (see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)) and national origin (see Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)) are such classifications. The common traits of a suspect
classification are that the class is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a his-
tory of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political power-
lessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
15 411 U.S. at 16-17.
16 See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
17 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 97-110 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This "two-tier"
approach was characterized by one commentator as two extremes-the upper tier is
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," while the lower tier is "minimal scrutiny in theory
and virtually none in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARv. L. REV, 1, 8 (1972).
18 See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 45 U.S. 432, 438-41 (1982); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 356-62 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197-99. See also Gunther, supra note 17;
Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of
Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
19 Mills v. Habluetzel, 102 S. Ct. at 1554.
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B. Evolution of the Standard of Review-The Supreme
Court's Recent Cases
The middle-level standard of review was not applied initially
by the Supreme Court in illegitimacy cases. 20 The Court first sub-
jected classifications based on legitimacy of birth to scrutiny
under the equal protection clause in Levy v. Louisiana21 and
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co. 2 In
both cases, the lower courts had held that "child" as used in the
Louisiana Wrongful Death Act meant "legitimate child." In
striking down the Louisiana statute in Levy, the Court used lan-
guage that implied the application of a strict scrutiny standard. 24
However, other language suggested that the statute failed to
meet even the minimum rational basis standard.25
In the third case in which the Court placed illegitimacy clas-
sifications under equal protection scrutiny, and the first case to
address an intestacy statute, the Court employed its most lenient
standard of review to date. In Labine v. Vincent, 26 the Court up-
held a Louisiana statute which permitted an acknowledged ille-
gitimate child to inherit from the father only if the father left no
lineal or collateral relatives or surviving spouse. 27 By distinguish-
ing Levy as a tort case and relegating the equal protection clause
discussion to a footnote,2 a five-member majority deferred to the
state's prerogative to regulate the disposition of property at
death.9
20 For a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court cases dealing with illegitimates"
rights vis-a-vis the equal protection clause, see Stenger, Expanding Constitutional Rights
of Illegitimate Children, 1968-1980, 19 J. F~m. L. 407 (1980-81).
21 391 U.S. at 68.
22 391 U.S. at 73.
23 Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 545, 546 n.1 (5th'Cir.
1967); Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1966).
24 Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that "we have been ex-
tremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights." 391 U.S. at 71.
25 The Court observed, "Though the test has been variously stated, the end result is
whether the line drawn is a rational one." Id. (emphasis added).
26 401 U.S. at 532.
27 LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1952).
28 The Court found a rational relationship between the statute and state interests in
promoting family life and directing the disposition of property at death. 401 U.S. at 536
n.6.
29 Id. at 538-39.
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The constitutionality of still another Louisiana statute was at
issue in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 30 The statute de-
clared-that unacknowledged but dependent illegitimate children
could not be provided benefits awarded to dependents of a de-
ceased employee under a worker's compensation statute.3' The
Court conceded that a distinction between acknowledged and
unacknowledged illegitimate children was convenient, 32 but it
still departed from its minimal rational basis standard of review
used a year earlier in Labine and invoked a balancing test be-
tween the state's rights and personal rights.33 Finding that the il-
legitimacy classification bore "no significant relationship to those
recognized purposes"34 of the statute, the Court in Weber ruled
that the statute violated the equal protection clause.
This upgraded level of scrutiny was applied a year later in
two per curiam opinions. In Gomez v. Perez,-, the Court inval-
idated a Texas statute which denied an illegitimate child the
right to enforce a support obligation against the father on the
grounds it denied the child equal protection. A New Jersey pro-
gram which limited welfare benefits to married parents and their
natural and adopted children also was struck down in New Jer-
sey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill. 36
The Weber balancing test was applied in Mathews v. Lucas7
and resulted in the approval of a Social Security Act provision 3
which required illegitimate children to prove their dependence
on the deceased father in order to receive benefits, while legit-
imate children were presumed dependent. The Lucas opinion is
most significant because it was in this case that the Court re-
jected the argument that classifications based on illegitimacy are
30 406 U.S. at 164.
31 Id. at 168.
32 Such a distinction eliminated the need of determining paternity on a case-by-case
basis. Id. at 174-75.
33 The Court inquired, "What legitimate state interest does the classification pro-
mote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?" Id. at 173.
34 Id. at 175. The term "significant" more closely resembles "substantial" than it
does "rational," signalling the application of a middle level scrutiny.
409 U.S. at 535.
36 411 U.S. at 619.
37 427 U.S. at 495.
-' 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1976).
[Vol. 71
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"suspect." 39 Conceding that illegitimacy is analogous in many re-
spects to the personal characteristics that have been held to be
suspect when used as the basis of statutory classifications, 40 the
Court nevertheless concluded that the analogy was not sufficient
to require its most exacting scrutiny. 4' However, despite its re-
fusal to apply strict scrutiny to the illegitimacy classification, the
Court emphasized that its scrutiny was "not a toothless one." 42 In
addition, the Court determined that the statute was "carefully
tuned to alternative considerations,"' 43 implying a need to exam-
ine the alternatives and adopt a statute which does not unduly
restrict the inheritance rights of illegitimate children.
Against this background, the Court clarified its standard of
review in Trimble v. Gordon.44 The plaintiff in Trimble, an ille-
gitimate child, had been acknowledged by her father in a pater-
nity action during his lifetime, but her parents had never mar-
ried. The Illinois intestacy statute45 provided that an illegitimate
person could inherit from the father only if acknowledged by him
and if the illegitimate's parents had married. The Illinois court,
basing its conclusion on grounds found valid in Labine,46 had de-
clared the statute constitutional. 47 Without overruling Labine,4
39 "[D]iscrimination between individuals on the basis of their legitimacy does not
'command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process,' which our
most exacting scrutiny would entail." 427 U.S. at 506 (citation omitted).
40 Id. at 505. See note 14 supra for a discussion of such characteristics.
41 Id. at 506.
42 Id. at 510.
41 Id. at 513.
44 430 U.S. at 762.
45 See note 8 supra for the relevant language of the Illinois statute.
46 The state's interests were in family relationships and in accurate and efficient dis-
position of property at death. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Labine.
47 In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234, 238-41 (IMl. 1975).
48 The Court distinguished Labine in several aspects, and as for those aspects indis-
tinguishable, it added this caveat: "Despite these differences, it is apparent that we have
examined the Illinois statute more critically than the Court examined the Louisiana stat-
ute in Labine. To the extent that our analysis in this case differs from that in Labine the
more recent analysis controls." 430 U.S. at 776 n.17. Labine's status was now a problem
for many courts:
The Trimble opinion. . . shrinks from overruling Labine, perhaps
imparting to its own decisions, legitimate or illegitimate, the same equality
the 14th Amendment guarantees to persons. In any event, whether Labine is
1982-83]
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the United States Supreme Court found these same grounds in-
sufficient in the Illinois statutory scheme. 49 Although it reiterated
that a classification based on illegitimacy was not subject to strict
scrutiny, 50 the Court made it clear that its standard, in requiring
the statute to be "carefully tuned to alternative considerations,'5
was stricter than the rational relation standard used in Labine.
However, the strength of this new standard was undercut by the
narrow 5-4 decision, in which the dissent would have affirmed
the Illinois decision on the basis of Labine. 52
This underlying weakness surfaced nineteen months later,
when the Court apparently employed a less stringent standard of
review 53 of the illegitimacy classification in Lalli v. Lalli. "' In a
splintered decision, 55 the Court upheld a New York statute0
left hanging like a withered arm or has actually been cut off and replaced by
an unaccountable pretense that it is still there, Trimble certainly applies to
this case.
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d at 539.
49 The Court noted that it had "rejected the argument that a state may attempt to in-
fluence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their
illegitimate relationships." 430 U.S. at 769. Further, there was nothing to indicate that
the denial of inheritance rights bore any relationship to the state's goal, regardless of
whether or not it was proper, of promoting legitimate family relationships. Id. at 768-69.
As to the state's recognized interest in the orderly disposition of property at death,
the Court determined that this statute was not "carefully tuned to alternative consider-
ations" (Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 513) as it precluded inheritance even when a judi-
cial determination or formal acknowledgment eliminated the uncertainty of paternity.
430 U.S. at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 513).
'0 430 U.S. at 767.
51 Id. at 772.
52 Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, wrote
the majority opinion. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun and
Rehnquist, dissented. In a separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist proposed departing from the
rational basis test only in cases where classifications were based on race or national origin.
Id. at 780-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
53 For an in-depth comparison of Trimble and Lalli, see Note, Has the Equal Protec-
tion Standardfor Illegitimates Been Revised?: Lalli v. Lalli, 21 B.C.L. REv. 478, 492-501
(1980). See also Comment, Trimble v. Gordon and Lalli v. Lalli: Shall the Sins of the
Father Be Visited upon the Sons?, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 578 (1979).
54 439 U.S. at 259.
55 justice Powell was joined by Justices Burger and Stewart in the plurality. Justice
Stewart wrote a separate concurrence distinguishing Trimble. Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist concurred, but would have overruled Trimble. Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall and Stevens (who, with Powell, had comprised the Trimble majority) dissented, for
they believed Trimble should have invalidated the New York statute.
56 N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a) (2) (McKinney 1967) provided that:
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which permitted an illegitimate child to inherit from an intestate
father only if a court order of filiation was issued prior to the
father's death. In Lalli, the father had acknowledged paternity
of his illegitimate son in a notarized permission for the boy to
marry. In upholding the New York law denying inheritance, the
Court distinguished Trimble. The Illinois statute had provided
for inheritance only if there had been a marriage of the parents
and acknowledgment of the child by the father, and the statute
had as one of its purposes the promotion of legitimate family re-
lationships.57 The New York statute, on the other hand, allowed
an illegitimate child to inherit from the father if a successful pa-
ternity action had been brought during the father's lifetime, and,
further, its only purpose was the orderly distribution of property
by preventing spurious claims of paternity after the father's
death. s This alternative means of qualification and singular ac-
ceptable purpose enabled the Court to conclude that the New
York statute was "substantially related to the important state in-
terests the statute is intended to promote." 59 A unified dissent
found the New York law "not substantially related to the legit-
imate interests that the statute purports to promote," in that it
was overbroad in excluding "forms of proof which do not com-
promise the State['s] interests." 6' Although Justice Powell in his
(a) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his
issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during
the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a
proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two
years from the birth of the child.
57 430 U.S. at 768-69. See note 49 supra for a discussion of the deficiencies of the Illi-
nois statute.
58 439 U.S. at 268-69.
'9 Id. at 275-76. For a discussion of this apparent retreat from the standard of review
used in Trimble, see Note, Illegitimates and Equal Protection: Lalli v. Lalli-A Retreat
from Trimble v. Gordon, 57 DEN. L.J. 453 (1980).
60 439 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61 Id. (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 772 n.14). The dissent pointed out
the practical anomaly that would result. Illegitimate children who were being supported
by their fathers, those most likely to be intended beneficiaries in the event of his death,
would not petition for a court order of filiation for fear of disrupting the support relation-
ship. For the same reason, neither their mothers nor social agencies would intervene.
Thus, the most likely intended beneficiaries would never inherit under New York law,
whereas those unsupported children who filed and won a court action would inherit. Id.
at 278.
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opinion upholding the statute purported to use the Trimble anal-
ysis, 62 the inquiry as to whether the statute was "carefully tuned
to alternative considerations"' was abandoned. 4 This reduction
in the level of scrutiny in Lalli returned the illegitimate intestate
succession standard of review to pre-Trimble murkiness.
Although Trimble and Lalli are the Court's latest word in the
area of intestate succession of illegitimates, its most recent deci-
sion applying the equal protection clause to the classification of
illegitimacy is Mills v. Habluetzel. 6 In Mills, a Texas statute pro-
viding for a one-year statute of limitations for establishing pater-
nity was held to deny illegitimate children the equal protection
of the law. The case does little to clarify the difference between
Trimble and Lalli, although it reiterates the substantial relation
test used in Lalli, Trimble and Lucas. 6
In sum, the Court has recently abandoned the rational basis
test in favor of a more stringent middle tier standard, requiring
that classifications be substantially related to permissible state in-
terests. However, the exact parameters of the middle tier stan-
dard remain unclear. 7
6 2 Id. at 266.
63 430 U.S. at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 513).
64 In fact, its necessity was refuted: "[I]t is not the function of a court 'to hypothesize
independently on the desirability or feasibility of any possible alternative[s] .... 439
U.S. at 274 (citations omitted).
65 102 S. Ct. at 1549.
66 The Court observed that restrictions aimed at preventing the prosecution of state
and fraudulent claims will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substan-
tialy related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 1554.
67 One explanation for the apparent incongruity of these Supreme Court decisions is
based upon their subject matter. Most of the illegitimacy cases to which the Supreme
Court applied equal protection clause analysis did not deal with intestacy statutes: Levy
and Glona (Wrongful Death Act), Weber (workers' compensation), Gomez (support),
New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization (welfare benefits), Mathews (Social Security
Act), and Mills (statute of limitations in paternity actions). All but Mathews were resolved
in favor of the illegitimates.
However, when the subject matter has been intestacy rights, a traditional state
bailiwick, the Court's reluctance to invade this domain has been apparent in its opinions.
Of Labine, Trimble, and Lalli, only Trimble was resolved in favor of the illegitimate.
Arguably, Trimble and Lalli can be reconciled. The Illinois statute in Trimble gave an
illegitimate no option by which he or she could initiate action to inherit from the father-
only the father, by marrying the mother and acknowledging the child, could provide for
the illegitimate's inheritance. The New York statute in Lalli, conversely, provided an op-
INHERITANCE BIGHTS
C. Lessons From Trimble and Lalli
Since the Lalli Court chose not to overrule Trimble, both de-
cisions must be considered by state legislatures attempting to
codify the intestate succession rights of illegitimate children. 8
Clearly, a state law must accomplish legitimate state objectives
in order to be valid. From Trimble, objectives such as promoting
legitimate family relationships69 or following the presumed intent
of the state's citizens7° apparently will not pass muster under the
equal protection clause. One valid state objective is the orderly
disposition of property at death, which implies the need to pre-
vent spurious claims and their attendant proof problems. Of
course, a state could be fairly assured that if its illegitimate intes-
tacy succession statute requires a court order of filiation during
the father's lifetime for the purpose of ease of estate administra-
tion, its statute would survive challenge. 71 This, judging from the
narrow decision in Lalli, may be the most restrictive alternative,
in providing means by which an illegitimate child may inherit, to
meet constitutional approval. 72 A state would be equally assured
portunity for the illegitimate (or someone in the illegitimates behalf) to initiate a filiation
order. The Supreme Court's recognition of the inherent problems in paternity claims and
its acknowledgment of the desirability of a "clear and convincing' standard of proof in es-
tablishing such claims, led it to declare New York's solution to this problem constitutional.
Illinois' solution, on the other hand, left the illegitimate no self-help alternative in estab-
lishing inheritance rights and was thus too narrow.
8 This problem was noted by Justice Blackmun in his Lalli concurrence: "If Trimble
is not a derelict, the corresponding statutes of other States will be of questionable validity
until this Court passes on them, one by one, as being on the Trimble side of the line or the
Labine-Lalli side." 439 U.S. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
69 430 U.S. at 769.
70 Id. at 775 n.16.
71 Essentially, this would be identical to the New York statute upheld in Lalli.
72 It is interesting to speculate on what effect the change in Court personnel would
have, if any, upon a future case deciding the fate of a Lalli type statute. Justice O'Connor
replaced Justice Stewart, a member of the plurality in Lalli. In Mills, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence noted practical obstacles to filing a paternity suit similar to those voiced by
Justice Brennan in his Lalli dissent:
For example, if, because of the continuing relationship between the natural
father and the mother, the father has provided the child with financial sup-
port for several years, the mother understandably would be unlikely or even
unwilling to jeopardize her relationship with the child's father by filing a pa-
ternity suit in order to protect her child's right to financial support at some
indeterminate future date. Alternatively, the child may have lived with the
1982-83]
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that a statute requiring the marriage of the illegitimate child's
parents and an acknowledgment of the child by the father would
be found unconstitutional.7 3 As to other alternative means of es-
tablishing paternity, a statute will most likely withstand attack
under a Trimble-Lalli analysis if the state's objective is the order-
ly disposition of the decedent's property and if the statute pro-
vides for a means of establishing paternity within the child's con-
trol (a court adjudication of paternity would be an example of an
action the child, or one in his or her behalf, could initiate; the
marriage of the child's parents would be out of the child's con-
trol). 74
II. A SAMPLING OF REACTIONS TO TRIMBLE & LALLI
A. Statutory Reaction
In response to the Court's decision in Trimble and Lalli,
many jurisdictions have amended their intestacy statutes regard-
ing illegitimate children. The statutory schemes adopted are
many and varied, but generally they can be grouped into five
categories. First, some statutes have adopted the language of the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC).7- Basically, these statutes allow il-
legitimate children to inherit from their intestate fathers if 1) the
illegitimate's natural parents marry before or after the birth of
the child, 2) paternity is established by an adjudication before
the death of the father, or 3) paternity is established after the
death of the father by clear and convincing proof.7 6 A second
father alone or his relatives for a number of years, a situation that leaves the
child obviously unable to sue his father to establish paternity.
102 S. Ct. at 1557-58 (footnotes omitted).
73 Such a statute would mirror the statute found unconstitutional in Trimble. See
text accompanying notes 44-49 supra for a discussion of Trimble.
7' This analysis presumes continuation of the Court's application of middle level
scrutiny to classifications based on illegitimacy. Were the Court to adopt the strict scrutiny
applied to suspect classifications, statutory means by which the illegitimate child could
qualify for inheritance would necessarily have to be broadened.
75 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109, 8 U.L.A. 328 (West Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as UPC].
76 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2109 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-109 (1979);
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general category substitutes the UPC's clear and convincing
proof requirement with an acknowledgment of paternity by the
father.7 This acknowledgment differs in its requirements; some
states require a writing under oath, 78 while others find a public
or witnessed acknowledgment will suffice. 79 The third group
adds, rather than substitutes, the acknowledgment of paternity
provision to those alternatives found in the UPC."° A fourth cat-
egory is comprised of statutes employing varying mixtures of the
second and third groups, but usually allowing only two means by
which an illegitimate child can inherit from the father. For
example, a state may allow an illegitimate child to inherit from
the father pursuant to an adjudication of paternity or marriage
of the parents;8' an adjudication of paternity or an acknowledg-
ment by the father;8 2 or clear and convincing proof of paternity
or marriage of the parents.8 The intestacy statutes described in
these first four categories are constitutional, as they all meet-or
exceed the minimal statutory alternatives for inheritance found
constitutional in Lalli. The fifth group of statutes, which require
marriage of the parents plus an acknowledgment by the father
before an illegitimate child can inherit from an intestate father, s8
are unconstitutional under Trimble.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.060 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-11-109 (1973)
(substituting a "preponderance of the evidence" standard for the UPGs standard of "clear
and convincing proof').
77 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-11-1, -2, 26-12-1 (1975 & Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45-274(b) (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108 (West Supp. 1983); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 190, § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (West
Supp. 1982-83); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 852.05
(West Supp. 1982-83).
78 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-274(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 1981).
79 E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215(c) (West Supp. 1982-83).
80 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, § 2-2(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2107(c) (2) (Purdon Supp. 1982-83).
81 See IND. CODE ANN. 29-1-2-7 (Burns 1972).
82 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (Cum. Supp.
1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 (1974).
83 See VA. CODE § 64.1-5.1 (1950). But see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141 (Cum. Supp.
1981) (provides six methods by which fathers can legitimize their children).
84 A dwindling minority of states are left with this type of statute (requiring mar-
riage and acknowledgment). See KRS § 391.090 (1972). See also W. VA. CODE § 42-1-6
(1982) (requiring only marriage). Both statutes were declared unconstitutional by their re-
spective state supreme courts but have not been revised. See note 11 supra and notes 101-
04 infra and accompanying text.
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Most states, apparently realizing that the elimination of in-
vidious discrimination against illegitimacy demands more than
the mere minimum, have gone beyond the requirements pre-
scribed in Lalli and yet have protected their interests in prevent-
ing fraudulent and spurious claims by enacting statutes such as
those included in the first four categories.
B. Subsequent Case Law
Though most state legislatures have reacted to the dictates of
Trimble and Lalli with statutory modifications, state courts have
had to determine the validity of their applicable statutes in sev-
eral instances. The respective judicial determinations vary de-
pending upon whether their statutory analysis fell on the
Trimble or the Labine-Lalli side of the line.8 Thus, while some
courts have elected to judge their statute in light of the minimal
alternatives criterion of constitutionality as exemplified by the
New York statute in Lalli, other courts have decided that a Lalli-
type statute is too restrictive to achieve fairness.
Everage v. Gibson86 falls into the first category. Faced with a
statute that allowed intestate succession by an illegitimate child
only after the marriage of the parents and recognition of the
child by the father, or the father's written declaration of pater-
nity, the Alabama Supreme Court had two choices: declare its
statute unconstitutional and leave any corrective action to the
legislature, or apply its paternity statute as a third method of le-
gitimation. 87 It opted for the latter course, adding a "judicial de-
termination of paternity" to the statutory alternatives. 8 This
brought the Alabama statutory scheme in line with New York's,
held constitutional in Lalli. 89
In Cox v. Harris,90 the federal district court found the appli-
cable Georgia statute9' met the constitutional minimum. The
85 This case-by-case determination was foreseen by Justice Blackmun in his Lalli
concurrence. See note 68 supra.
86 372 So. 2d 829 (Ala. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980).
87 Alabama's paternity statute provided for the legitimation of an illegitimate child
through a judicial determination of paternity. Id. at 833.
8 8 Id.
89 See id. at 832-33.
90 486 F. Supp. 219 (M.D. Ga. 1980).
91 GA. CODE ANN. § 133-904 (1933) (subsequently revised from requiring a petition
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statute provided for an illegitimate child's inheritance only by a
marriage of the parents and recognition of the child by the
father, or by the father's petitioning the court to establish pater-
nity. The court found "no substantial difference between the
New York statute and Georgia's own intestacy statute.- 92 But the
fact that in New York, the state, the child or the mother could in-
stitute a paternity proceeding, while Georgia left the petition
solely to the father, is a substantial difference and the Georgia
statute should have been declared unconstitutional.
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court found a Texas statute,93
which allowed for intestate succession from the father by an ille-
gitimate child only if the child's parents married or if the child
was legitimated under voluntary proceedings, to be constitution-
al in light of Lalli. 94
Lowell v. Kowalski95 exemplifies the second group of post-
Lalli cases which have decided that a Lalli-type statute is too re-
strictive to achieve fairness. While Lalli approved a minimal
method of proof to establish paternity (a formal acknowledg-
ment of paternity), this group is comprised of decisions which
hold that more alternative methods of establishing paternity are
required to enable illegitimate children to establish inheritance
rights and, thus, ensure a fair statute under the equal protection
clause. In Lowell, therefore, after the highest court of Massachu-
setts struck down the portion of its statute which required inter-
marriage of the natural parents as unconstitutional, the court
conceded that the remaining provisions which established ac-
knowledgment or adjudication of paternity as alternative
methods of establishing inheritance rights satisfied the minimal
by the father to establish paternity to a court adjudication of paternity, GA. CODE ANN. §
53-4-4 (1982)).
92 486 F. Supp. at 221.
93 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 1977).
94 Davis v. Jones, 626 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. 1982). This case dealt with the 1977
Probate Code, but in 1979 the Legislature added the alternative of a statement of pater-
nity to the methods by which an illegitimate child could inherit from an intestate father.
See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
95 405 N.E.2d 135 (Mass. 1980).
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Lalli constitutional standard.9" But the court stated that applying
a Lalli-type statutory interpretation and construing the statute as
constitutional "just because it happens to coincide with the fact
patterns of cases that have reached the Supreme Court might not
be the fair and appropriate way to interpret" its statute. 97 In-
stead, the court framed the issue as being "whether the statutory
classification is as narrow in its impact as possible, consistent
with the purpose of avoiding fraudulent claims against the estate
of a man who died intestate." ' Rejecting a Lalli-type statutory
interpretation the court accepted judicial adjudication of pater-
nity as one method of establishing inheritance rights, but decided
it would be unconstitutionally restrictive as the only method,
since it would "unnecessarily foreclose the rights of illegitimates
who could convincingly establish their parentage." 99
In striking down a West Virginia statute which required
marriage of the mother and father before the illegitimate child
could inherit from the father, 10 the West Virginia Supreme
Court went even further than the Massachusetts court. In Adkins
v. McEldowney,101 the West Virginia court labeled illegitimacy
as a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny. The court
found that illegitimacy as a class exemplified the characteristics
that made classes suspect-conditions of birth, history of past
discrimination, political powerlessness. 102 Recognizing its free-
dom to interpret its state equal protection clause as providing
greater but not lesser guarantees than comparable federal provi-
sions, the West Virginia court elevated the class of illegitimacy to
the protection afforded race and national origin. 103
Finally, a federal district court struck down a statute very
similar to the Georgia statute which had been upheld in Cox v.
Harris. 104 The New Hampshire statute in question provided for
96 Id. at 141.
9' Id. at 139.
98 Id. at 140.
99 Id. at 141.
"0 W. VA. CODE § a2-1-6 (1982).
10' 280 S.E.2d 231 (W. Va. 1981).
"A Id. at 233.
'o3 Id. at 233 n.3.
104 Robin C. v. Schweiker, 532 F. Supp. 677 (D.N.H. 1982).
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inheritance from the father where the parents married or where
the putative father brought a legitimation petition in state
court. 105 The court determined that the alternative provided (a
court action instituted by the father) was not enough to cause a
different result from that reached in Trimble. 116 Citing Lalli, the
court found that the "reach of the statute [is] far in excess of its
justifiable purposes."107
The divergent interpretations of Trimble and Lalli exempli-
fied by these two groups of cases reflect those courts' respective
balancing of the legitimate state interest in orderly property suc-
cession with fairness under the equal protection clause. The first
group placed more emphasis on the former, while the second be-
lieved that the desired protection against fraudulent paternity
claims could be maintained without discrimination, by provid-
ing more realistic alternatives under which illegitimates could in-
herit.
III. LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES
Against this backdrop the Kentucky General Assembly is left
with three options. It may elect to prescribe the bare minimum
to enable illegitimate children to inherit from their intestate
fathers and still withstand a constitutional attack. Such a statute
would provide at least one alternative by which the illegitimate
child (or someone in his or her behalf could initiate a paternity
action in order to inherit from an intestate father, as did the New
York statute in Lalli. Conversely, the legislature could adopt a
statute that will stand up even to strict scrutiny by the courts.
Such a statute, while promoting the compelling state interest in
the orderly distribution of property at death, would provide for
all reasonable alternatives by which an illegitimate child's in-
heritance rights may be established. Finally, the legislature may
choose to take the middle road.
In the regular session of the 1982 Kentucky General Assem-
bly, Senate Bill No. 354 was introduced in an attempt to clarify
105 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:42,460:29 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
106 532 F. Supp. at 680.
107 Id. at 681.
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the inheritance rights of illegitimate children.108 It provided that
an illegitimate child could inherit from the intestate father if: 1)
the father had executed a declaration of paternity before a circuit
court clerk, 2) the father's paternity had been adjudicated during
his lifetime or after his death, 3) paternity had been proven by
clear and convincing evidence (a certificate of acknowledgment
in 1) or an authorized copy of the judgment in 2) is sufficient
proof), or 4) the child's parents intermarry and the father ac-
knowledges the child. The bill was not enacted, primarily due to
legislative time constraints. 109 The proposed bill satisfies the con-
stitutional requirements, as its alternatives for illegitimate in-
heritance exceed the statutory provisions declared valid in Lalli.
The bill also protects against spurious paternity claims, for the
options consist of the father's own declaration of acknowledg-
ment and marriage to the mother, a court adjudication or a stan-
dard of clear and convincing proof. Finally, the bill is fair to the
108 S.B. 354 § 1(1), 1982 Ky. General Assembly.
109 Gomez v. Perez, 408 U.S. at 538. One objection to the bill was that it placed a
cloud upon the title to real property. Heirs and devisees as well as their successors and as-
signs will be uncertain of the strength of their title until the appropriate statute of limitat-
ions bars the claims of any unknown illegitimate child. However, as the Kentucky
Supreme Court's decisions in Pendleton and Fykes establish the right of an illegitimate
child to inherit from the father's estate, the enactment of this bill will not create a new
cloud on title. The proposed bill merely codifies the present case law.
Moreover, other potential clouds on title presently exist under Kentucky statutes.
For example KRS 394.295 creates a ten year period after the death of the testator in which
to vacate a judgment because of the discovery of a later executed will. KRS 413.160 estab-
lishes a ten year statute of limitation for other probate disputes. In Reid's Adm'r v. Benge,
66 S.W. 997 (Ky. 1902) the rights of the devisees under a will probated seven years after
the testator's death prevailed over the rights of a good faith mortgagee of the intestate
taker. Therefore, concepts of basic fairness mandate that if other clouds on title are toler-
ated, it is no objection that this statute codifies another potential cloud on title.
Intestate property of a mother of an illegitimate child is subject to the child's
claims after her death. Intestate property of the father should not be treated differently.
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Trimble v. Gordon rests on the unconstitutional dis-
tinction between an illegitimate child's right to inherit from the mother and the father. In
rectifying the problem which caused KRS 391.090 to be declared unconstitutional, the
legislature should not create a new distinction between an illegitimate child's right to in-
herit from the mother and the father.
Finally, the proposed statute contains an incentive for prompt adjudication of
the illegitimate child's rights. In a post-death adjudication of paternity, the claimant must
establish paternity by clear and convincing evidence. The passage of time causes a claim of
paternity to become stale. Therefore, there is an ever decreasing likelihood of the claimant
meeting that burden.
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illegitimate child in providing a means by which the child can
gain his or her inheritance rights. This Comment suggests one ad-
dition, borrowed from UPC section 2-109, to the proposed bill:
that the words "even though the attempted marriage is void" be
added to part 4). An attempted marriage, coupled with the
father's acknowledgment, should be sufficient proof of the
father's paternity.
CONCLUSION
The state has both a right and a duty to ensure the orderly
disposition of property after an intestate father's death. Proof of
paternity, particularly after the father's death, can present prob-
lems and disrupt this orderly disposition. "Those problems are
not to be lightly brushed aside, but neither can they be made into
an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious
discrimination."l ° These potential proof problems can and
should be handled'by a demanding standard of proof, that of
clear and convincing evidence, to establish paternity when the
father has not or will not acknowledge it-not by limiting the al-
ternatives by which the illegitimate child may attempt to inherit
from an intestate father. Lalli dictates only that there be a sub-
stantial relation between the state's interests and the means used
to protect those interests. But, since "no child is responsible for
his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-
as well as unjust-way of deterring the parent,""' basic fairness
dictates more. The General Assembly should enact legislation
similar to Senate Bill No. 354 in its next session.
J. Clarke Keller
110 Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. at 538.
11 Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. at 175.
1982-83]

